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Economic sanctions are usually defined as restrictions on customary trade and 
financial relations imposed by one or more countries against a target country, 
group, or individual for political and security policy purposes. Most existing 
studies of the effects of sanctions and blockades, whether bilateral or 
multilateral, are conducted from the perspective of the initiating or ‘sender’ 
country, which is typically a great power, e.g., the United States. However, 
there is a lack of literature on the possible policies that target nations may 
develop to prevent compromising their security, especially economic security, 
as well as neutralize the negative impact of sanctions. Sanctions and blockades 
disrupt the flow of international trade in goods, services and capital. These 
have consequences for the composition of output, employment, consumption 
and investment, and may also exert substantial effects on households, firms 
and government expenditures in targeted nations. Thus, it is important to 
understand the effects of blockades and sanctions on economic growth and 
public expenditure on security, military, health and education. Apart from the 
long-run growth consequences of sanctions and blockades, many of the 
macroeconomic effects are likely to be relatively short-lived, decaying over 
time as the economy adjusts to sanctions. Therefore, econometric techniques 
applied to investigate the impact of sanctions should be able to capture the 
simultaneous interplay between economic outcomes, political factors and 
adjustment processes, as in reality economics and politics are inseparable. 
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What the political economy literature tells us about 
blockades and sanctions1 
1 Introduction 
The levying of economic sanctions with political objectives in mind has been 
an instrument of statecraft since time immemorial, the Athenian economic 
sanctions against Megara being a prime example dating back to 432 BC. Their 
use persists to the present day, with sanctions directed against Iran, North 
Korea and the blockade of Qatar serving as current examples. Indeed, the 
popularity of sanctions as a foreign policy tool has increased since the end of 
the Cold War and nearly 800 episodes of sanctions were initiated only within 
the first 15 years of that period (Morgan et al., 2014). 
Economic sanctions are a foreign policy tool used to coerce foreign 
governments, i.e. sanction targets, into behaviour desired by sanctions’ sender 
(e.g., Baldwin, 2000; Askari et al., 2003). They signal the sender’s willingness to 
interfere in the decision-making process of another sovereign state or impair its 
capabilities (Early, 2012). Sanctions can be used to either explicitly or implicitly 
affect regime and structural change in the target country, often motivated by 
human rights or desire for democratic reforms. Thus, sanctions could be 
considered as an indicator that, in practice, state sovereignty is no longer 
inviolable (Weiss, 1999). Askari et al. (2003) argue that economic sanctions aim 
towards achieving non-economic ends and that they are more preferred than 
other options, such as military interventions, due to their relatively lower costs 
on both the sender and the innocent citizens in the targeted country. Probably 
the most famous sanctions aimed at regime change are the decades-long US 
sanctions against Cuba. Notably, regime change has been the purpose of more 
than 50% of post-Cold War sanction episodes (Hufbauer et al., 2007). For 
example, the blockade of Qatar, which began in 2017 and involves banning 
Qatari aeroplanes and ships from entering the sender countries’ airspace and 
sea routes, and closing the land crossing with Saudi Arabia, is aimed at 
pressuring the Qatari authorities to alter a number of their domestic and 
foreign policies. Another major motivation behind sanctions, but not 
necessarily directly applicable to the blockade of Qatar, is military impairment. 
For example, sanctions imposed on North Korea, Iran and, in the past, Iraq, 
Pakistan, India and South Korea, were aimed at preventing those countries 
from obtaining nuclear, chemical or biological weapons (Hufbauer et al., 2007).  
 
1 The work was done as a Part of Project # NPRP12S-0310-190280 “Economic, 
political and security aspects of sanctions and blockades from a target country 
perspective: policy lessons for Qatar and other target countries” funded by the Qatar 
National Research Fund. 
The authors: Sajjad Faraji Dizaji, Tarbiat Modares University, Iran and Qatar 
University. s_dizaji@modares.ac.ir; Piotr Lis, Coventry University, UK. 
ab2991@coventry.ac.uk; Syed Mansoob Murshed, International Institute of Social 
Studies (ISS), Erasmus University Rotterdam and Coventry University, UK. 
murshed@iss.nl; Mahjoob Zweiri, Qatar University. mzweiri@qu.edu.qa  
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Sanctions against Iran have a long history and are probably the most 
researched. Since its Islamic revolution in 1979, the country has been under 
harsh rounds of US sanctions which in some periods have been supported by 
other Western countries. Every new round of sanctions has provoked the 
Iranian government to apply a series of countermeasures to neutralize their 
negative impact. The retaliation strategies adopted by Iran have influenced its 
economic, political and trade relationships with the GCC countries (Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). Economic 
diplomacy has become an important tool of Iran’s policy as the country has 
tried to shift its trade away from Europe towards other GCC and Asian 
countries. Iran has effectively increased the level of trade and investment links 
with its GCC and other neighbors in order to discourage them from joining 
the US and EU-imposed sanctions. The difficulties in trading with the major 
European partners during the sanctions period have motivated Iran to 
increasingly rely on re-exporting opportunities through its GCC neighbours 
(Dizaji, 2018). Perhaps for these reasons, the unilateral sanctions imposed by 
the US have not had a great impact on Iran, as argued by Alikhani (2000) and 
Cordesman et al., (2014), but instead damaged American interests. For 
example, after the US had introduced the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), 
American firms, which once had supported the 1979 sanctions against Iran, 
intensified pressure to remove sanctions because they had found themselves 
paying their costs. Consequently, the US decreased sanctions against Iran 
(Fayazmanesh, 2008). 
 Iran and Qatar have similar economic structures as their economies and 
government revenues are heavily reliant on resource rents (Dizaji, 2014): oil 
and gas exports comprise the biggest part of their exports. Their main import 
products are capital, industrial and consumer goods as well as machinery, 
which are mainly obtained from developed countries. Such highly resource-
dependent countries may be more vulnerable to sanctions and blockades as 
their governments rely heavily on revenues from exporting one or several 
commodities. This makes it is easier for sender countries to obstruct their 
financial channels (Dizaji, 2019b). However, exports diversification strategies 
may be applied to reduce their vulnerability to potential sanctions.  
As we show in this review paper, most existing studies of the effects of 
sanctions and blockades, both bilateral or multilateral, are conducted from the 
perspective of the initiating or sender country, usually a major global power 
such as the United States (Peksen, 2019b). Previous studies have mainly 
focused on whether the sanctions were successful in achieving their political 
aims, such as regime change, or concerned mainly with disruptions to 
international trade and financial flows. There is a relative scarcity of studies 
focusing on the effects of sanctions on target economies – the few existing 
studies focus on how sanctions can be effective in damaging the target 
economy. However, there is a lack of literature on the possible sanctions 
coping policies that target nations may develop to prevent compromising their 
security, especially economic security, as well as neutralize the negative impact 
of sanctions. Kozhanov (2011) recognised that most definitions of economic 
sanctions tend to mislead researchers as they usually concentrate on relations 
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between the “sanctioning state/states (the sender) and the sanctioned country 
(the target)”, which eliminates factors such as the decision of the political elite 
in the sender country to implement punitive measures, how far is the 
sanctioned country able to mitigate negative economic effects, the loyalty of 
the target country’s population, the role of international environment, 
including behaviour of third countries and international cooperation. 
The purpose of this review paper is to consider results of the existing 
studies on the economic, political and security impacts of sanctions and 
blockades in a variety of target countries and highlight the remaining research 
gaps. Moreover, it tries to summarize the factors that are important in 
determining the success and failure of economic sanctions.  
The review is organized as follows: section 2 provides a brief overview of 
the economic effects of the sanctions. Section 3 reviews the impacts of 
sanctions on International trade and investment, and section 4 highlights the 
political and social impacts of sanctions. The methodological challenges 
regarding the modelling and capturing the impacts of sanctions in previous 




2  Economic effects 
Turning to the economic effects first, economic sanctions disrupt the flow of 
international trade in goods, and services as well as the flow of capital. So, in 
many ways sanctions are akin to quantitative trade policies and restrictions on 
financial flows. From the viewpoint of standard textbook economics, these are 
welfare reducing. If the sender country is a major economy, it may remain 
largely unaffected by trade restrictions as the magnitude of trade disruptions is 
usually quite small relative to the size of its economy. Its economic inter-
dependence with the target nation is likely to be relatively small, or the sanction 
itself, if directed against a major trade partner may be partial or small in terms 
of magnitude. Trade sanctions directed towards major trade partners are rarely 
prohibitive in nature, in other words trade is not eliminated, as is exemplified 
by the recent US governments trade restrictions on Chinese imports. In 
contrast, the disruptions may be substantial for the target country that is not a 
major economy. Hence, the costs of the sanction in economic terms is far 
greater for the target than for the sender. When sanctions are directed against 
major (economic and political) powers they tend to be selective. Murshed 
(2020) presents a theoretical Keynesian (or structural) macroeconomic model 
of trade and financial sanctions imposed by a country in the global North 
against a target in the global South. The sanctions can restrict both exports and 
imports of the target country as well as financial flows to it and unambiguously 
hurt the targeted nation. In some circumstances the sender can improve its 
terms of trade. A more neoclassical macro-model can be found in Eyler (2007, 
chapter 5).  
Economic sanctions will have consequences for the composition of 
output, employment levels, consumption, investment as well as government 
expenditures (Farzanegan, 2011; Dizaji, 2014). Apart from the long-run growth 
consequences, many of the macroeconomic effects of sanctions are likely to be 
short-lived, decaying over time as the economy adjusts to sanctions (Dizaji & 
van Bergeijk, 2013). There is a paucity of explicit theoretical analyses of the 
macroeconomic impact of sanctions, however. In addition to the 
macroeconomic effects, there are effects on households and firms. Households 
may experience loss of purchasing power which may affect adults and children 
in terms of malnutrition and adverse health and education outcomes, as was 
the case in the UN sanctions against Iraq  during the 1990s (Ali & Shah, 2000; 
Popal, 2000; Simons, 2016). In response to increasing concerns on human 
costs of sanctions, the UN and the Iraqi government reached an agreement 
and established the ‘oil-for-food’ program, which enabled the country to 
export a limited amount of oil in order to import basic foods and medicine. 
Sanctioned countries may also experience increases in economic inequality and 
poverty rate, harming the ordinary citizens more than target country’s leaders 
(Afesorgbor & Mahadevan, 2016).  
In response to being a target of sanctions, or an increased risk of such an 
outcome, governments are expected to design plans and strategies aimed 
atreducing the various adverse effects. Examples of such strategies include the 
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concept of a “resistance economy” which has been frequently highlighted by 
Iranian anti-Western parties (Babak, 2013; Poorolajal, 2017). It relies on import 
substitution and favours domestic over foreign investment in order to reduce 
the target’s reliance on sanctioning economies and strengthen its resilience 
against international sanctions. The target country may try to develop its 
political and economic ties with the enemies and political opponents of the 
sender country to offset the negative impact of sanctions and also to send a 
political signal to the sender country that the target will not condone the 
sender’s inimical action. On the other hand, the ongoing political crisis 
between the sender and the target may lead to “sanctions busting” and 
motivate third countries to expand their economic ties with the target nation in 
order to benefit from economic opportunities arising from the sender’s 
decision to restrict trade with the target. A similar outcome labelled as the 
“black knight effect” may be driven by political motivations of third countries 
(Hufbauer et al., 2007; Drury, 1998; Dizaji, 2018). The latter phenomenon is an 
interesting avenue for research in the context of cooperation between Iran and 
Qatar. Both countries are suffering from sanctions and, moreover, Iran is the 
regional political competitor to Saudi Arabia and its regional allies (i.e., UAE, 
Bahrain and Egypt) who imposed the blockade on Qatar. Such strategies have 
yet not received much attention from researchers and there is no sufficient 
evidence on whether, and under what conditions, such efforts could be 
successful. Providing empirical evidence and innovative recommendations for 
policies mitigating negative economic and political effects of sanctions should 
be another priority of the future research. 
2.1 Effects on economic growth 
The sanctions literature is overwhelmingly dominated by studies of sanctions 
imposed by the US and a handful of multilateral organizations such as the UN 
(e.g., Early, 2012; Neuenkirch & Neumeier, 2015). Those studies show 
evidence of a strong and long-lasting negative impact of UN-imposed 
sanctions on target country’s economic growth, nonetheless, this effect 
decreases over time. In the first econometric study of the effect of economic 
sanctions on economic development of the target country, Neuenkirch and 
Neumeier (2015) analyse the effect of the US and UN-imposed sanctions on 
68 countries over the period from 1976 to 2012. They find that sanctions 
imposed by UN on average reduce the growth of GDP per capita in a target 
country by 2.3 – 3.5 percentage points and their effect lasts for a period of 10 
years. The impact increases with the severity of sanctions (and embargoes) – 
severe restrictions that affect nearly all economic activity tend to decrease 
GDP growth by over 5 percentage points. In comparison, US-only sanctions 
have a much smaller and shorter lasting impact on the targeted economy, and 
reduce GDP growth by 0.5 – 0.9 percentage points over a seven-year period. 
The impact of US sanctions is more heterogeneous across target countries than 
that of UN sanctions which probably could be explained, at least partly, by US 
sanctions being relatively easier to circumvent by increasing trade with other 
countries or negligible economic links with the US in the pre-sanctions period.  
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Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2015) consider also the detrimental effect of 
sanctions on target’s GDP over time and conclude that it decreases in time. 
The negative effect on GDP growth is shown to decrease each year since the 
sanction imposition by 0.32 and 0.17 percentage points for the UN and US 
sanctions, respectively. They propose two potential explanations for this 
finding. First, sanctions which manage to inflict serious economic pain to the 
target may be more effective in achieving their objectives and thus lifted 
sooner. Second, the longer the target is able to resist the economic and political 
duress of sanctions the more likely it will find channels to circumvent their 
impact and restore investors’ confidence. 
The literature’s focus on the UN- and US-imposed sanctions might mean 
that the existing literature produces a biased picture of the impact of economic 
sanctions and blockades, which may not be applicable to sanction episodes not 
involving either of these senders, such as the recent blockade of Qatar. Thus, 
there is a significant knowledge gap in the area of the effectiveness and effects 
of sanctions imposed by countries that are not major global powers. 
2.2 Public and military spending 
Sanctions not only increase international tensions, but often are a prelude to or 
accompanied by a military intervention (Hufbauer et al., 2007), thus they may 
lead to increases in the target nation’s military spending. Dizaji and Farzanegan 
(2019) develop a theoretical model to consider the impact of sanctions on 
military spending. They assume that sanctions have two different effects on the 
target country: security and income effects. According to the security effect, 
imposing the sanctions informs the target country that the sender is serious 
about pursuing its wishes and non-compliance may result in a military attack in 
the future. This motivates the target country to increase the military spending 
to resist a possible military intervention. According to the income effect, 
sanctions reduce the financial resources of the target country and consequently 
decrease its military expenditures. Therefore, the final impact of sanctions on 
target’s military expenditures depends on the relative size of these two effects. 
If the income effect is stronger than the security effect, the military spending 
will decrease, otherwise it will increase. The intensity with which sanctions are 
applied may also be important for controlling military spending of the target 
country. Unilateral sanctions did not seem to have a statistically significant 
impact on Iran’s military spending, whereas multilateral sanctions led to 
significant reductions in Iran’s military expenditures. Dizaji (2019a, 2019b) 
argues that this effect is achieved through influencing political institutions 
within the target country.  
In the study of the impact of sanctions on civil war in Africa, Hultman 
and Peksen (2017) distinguish between imposed and threatened sanctions, and 
between arms embargo and economic sanctions. Their findings show that 
imposed arms embargoes are likely to moderate conflict violence. Perversely, 
economic sanctions, wheater actually imposed or only threatened, and threats 
of arms embargoes are likely to increase conflict violence. Lektzian and 
Sprecher (2007) argue that sanctioned countries may increase their military 
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capabilities in order to demonstrate that they are not vulnerable to the external 
threats. Escribà-Folch (2009) points out that if sanctions manage to reduce 
external revenues, they may lead to a reduction in the amount of patronage 
that dictators provide to their supporters through public expenditures.   
In a more recent study of more than 40 developing countries over the 
period 1990-2017, Dizaji and Murshed (2020) demonstrate that while military 
expenditures decrease in response to arms embargo shocks, the expenditures 




3 Effects on international trade and investment 
Sanctions as a foreign policy tool have not been immune to economic 
globalization: as economies tend to be more open to international trade and 
international financial systems, they also become more sensitive to economic 
sanctions. In that respect, sanctions are not very different from other trade 
policy instruments, such as tariffs, which have been shown to be increasingly 
used for political objectives under the current Trump administration in the 
USA (see Forrer & Harrington, 2019). Theoretically, targeted countries may 
suffer from a slump in exports and/or imports, relative loss of bargaining 
power in international markets and limited access to financial and capital asset 
markets or withdrawal of investors (Hufbauer et al., 2009; Evenett, 2002). 
Nevertheless, that increased openness may offer avenues for minimizing 
negative impacts of sanctions should they be imposed (e.g., Davis & 
Engerman, 2003). More open countries may find it easier to find alternative 
buyers of their products and suppliers of imports (Early, 2012), although one 
would expect there to be a higher cost a target economy would have to pay for 
such substitutes due to its diminished bargaining power in international 
markets (Neuenkirch & Neumeier, 2015). In some cases, sanctions may even 
spawn lucrative commercial opportunities. As the terms of trade of the target 
country change, its comparative advantage may shift offering incentives for 
third parties to step in and fill the trade gap (Kaempfer et al., 1999; Early, 
2012). Early (2009) shows that sanctions busting behaviour is observed in 65% 
of all sanction episodes. An expansion of the informal (shadow) economy may 
also be observed as economic agents try to evade sanction measures 
(Heine‐Ellison, 2001; Andreas, 2005; Lee, 2014).  
Shin et al. (2016) focus on the relationships between sanctions and 
international trade, foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio investment. 
Following theoretical considerations of the impact of sanctions on the target 
economies and a cross-section and time-series econometric analysis of 133 
countries between 1970 and 2005, they conclude that, on average, sanctions are 
not an effective foreign policy tool. Their results suggest that irrespective of 
the number of sending countries, type of sanctions and magnitude of costs to 
the senders and the target, on average sanctions fail to cause sufficient 
economic damages to the target to coerce it to behave in the way desired by 
the sanctions’ senders. They attribute this impotence of sanctions to the 
efficiency of global markets which ensure the flexibility of capital and trade in 
commodities. For example, when sanctions are imposed and sender country’s 
businesses leave the target country, a market gap is created which opens 
opportunities for either target’s domestic firms or firms from third countries. 
The target country can further incentivise businesses to invest and fill that gap 
by an implementation of appropriate policies such as tax incentives. 
Additionally, in spite of the sender’s wishes, its firms may find it difficult to 
withdraw their assets from the sanctioned country after having invested in 
large FDI projects (for more evidence, see Liu, 1997). Shin et al. (2016) show 
that economic regionalism in the form of trade blocs such as the EU, NAFTA, 
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ASEAN, APEC, or MERCOSUR may further impair the efficacy of economic 
sanctions by non-member states. In order to avert economic damage, the 
target country’s government may turn to other bloc members for help. The 
conclusion is that the sender must be able to prevent the target from 
redirecting its economic relations to other countries or markets for sanctions 
to achieve their objectives, otherwise sanctions are likely to fail. 
Haidar (2017) explores the export deflection mechanisms sparked by the 
sanctions on Iran. The study shows evidence that approximately two-thirds of 
Iranian exports which were initially wiped out by export sanctions were 
eventually deflected to third (non-sanctioning) countries. This shift was 
accompanied by adjustments at firms’ level. Haider (2017) observes that firms 
which traded only with the third countries prior to the sanctions increased their 
exports most significantly. In general, larger exporters appeared more adapt at 
deflecting their trade to alternative destinations and, on average, exporters were 
more likely to deflect their exports to (non-sanctioning) countries in which 
they had been present before sanctions were imposed. There was some welfare 
loss because the value-measured export deflection was achieved through price 
reduction and increases in traded quantities. Finally, the destinations of export 
deflection were countries that were more politically sympathetic to Iran. 
Haider’s observations of exporters’ behaviour are consistent with findings of 
other authors, not necessarily in the context of sanctions, who show that 
exporters tend to adjust to shocks in one market by changing their sales in 
other markets (Vannoorenberghe, 2012; Blum et al., 2013). Overall, in the case 
of Iran, Haider (2017) concludes that if the goal of sanctions was to restrict 
Iranian exports then they have failed due to the export deflection, but if the 
sanctions were aimed at inflicting considerable pain to domestic firms so that 
they would press the Iranian government for policy change then sanctions 
have turned out to be effective. 
In the specific context of economic blockades, Habibi (2019) investigates 
how the 2017 economic and transport blockade of Qatar by the other Gulf 
States has affected the region’s economic relations with Turkey, which 
opposed the blockade and expressed support for Qatar. Habibi (2019) 
observes a pronounced rise in bilateral Turkey – Qatar trade and investment 
flows, which is consistent with the export (import) deflection discussed above, 
and negative impact on Turkey’s economic ties with Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates. Qatar’s resilience and efficiency in rapid adaptation 
when faced with the blockade are emphasised in Bouoiyour and Selmi (2020) 
who note that Qatar has managed to retain its status as the world’s top 
exporter of liquefied natural gas. This has provided an ongoing cash flow 
which combined with substantial pre-blockade financial reserves constituted a 
buffer which allowed the country to accelerate structural reforms in order to 
ensure its international competitiveness and expansion of domestic food 
production. 
The importance of intensity of imposed sanctions in affecting the sender 
and target countries’ trade flows has also been emphasised in the literature.  
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Hufbauer and Oegg (2003) divide the sanctions into three categories 
considering their severity i.e., limited, moderate and extensive. They find that 
extensive sanctions affect trade flows significantly while, there is more variance 
regarding the trade impact of moderate and limited sanctions. Caruso (2003) 
finds that US unilateral extensive sanctions influence bilateral trade between 
targets and third countries negatively, while limited and moderate sanctions 
create a weak positive impact on their bilateral trade. Dizaji (2018) finds that, 
although the unilateral and limited US sanctions against Iran (before 2006) did 
not influence Iran’s exports to third countries significantly, they increased 
Iran’s imports from MENA, East Asia and EU countries. Moreover, he 
indicates that extensive sanctions imposed multilaterally by US and other 
Western countries against Iran significantly damaged Iran’s imports from third 
countries and exports to them. 
The current debate does not shed sufficient light on underlying processes 
because it lacks a dynamic dimension (Peksen, 2019b). Although some efforts 
have been made recently to evaluate the overall effectiveness of sanctions over 
time (see Dizaji & van Bergeijk, 2013), the current state of the art does not 
shed much light on the process of adjustment of the targeted economy or 
sectors to sanctions. In other words, we do not know how readily targets can 
adapt to foreign-imposed restrictions and we do not have reliable and 
systematic estimations of elasticities of substitution at country and sector levels 
(Peksen, 2019b). 
The impact of sanctions on trade flows, and the economy as a whole, is 
likely to materialize at the industry and firm level as they experience disruptions 
to their trade networks and otherwise profitable commercial activities (van 
Bergeijk, 1995). Firms may suffer from a loss of reputation, being isolated on 
the international markets as well as limited access to international credit 
markets as potential contractors and investors might be concerned about their 
ability to fulfil contracts (Neuenkirch & Neumeier, 2015). These disruptions 
are likely to have non-trivial effects on the economy’s value chains as firms 
within the target country face the necessity of seeking out new trading channels 
and opportunities to replace those lost due to the sanctions (Early, 2012). A 
good example here is the inflow of US firms wanting to bypass US sanctions 
against Iran to the United Arab Emirates after the country signed a defence 
agreement with the United States in 1994 (Swibel, 2004). Nonetheless, finding 
new buyers, suppliers and negotiating new deals is likely to result in a 
substantial increase in the firms’ transaction costs and lead to non-productive 
use of resources (Neuenkirch & Neumeier, 2015), which may put a significant 
burden on firms and the sanction-targeted economy as a whole in the 
immediate aftermath of the imposition of sanctions. To date, there is little 
evidence showing how long lasting such effects are likely to be, how long it 
takes industries and firms to recover and what is the long-run impact on the 
target economy’s competitiveness.  
Another issue which has so far been neglected in the literature is the effect 
that lifting of sanctions has on trade flows and economic relations between 
target and sender countries. The issue that remains unanswered is the pace at 
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which the two sides reconstruct their trade relationship, if at all. The recovery 
of trade after lifting of sanctions is not likely to be a mirror image of the 
changes that followed the imposition of sanctions and significant asymmetries 
are expected. An episode of sanctions damages the trust between the target 
and the sender, consequently increasing risks involved in trade and transaction 
costs of commercial relationships (Morrow et al., 1998; Lektzian & Souva, 
2001). The political conditions of the target and sender countries, both internal 
and external, are important in rebuilding the economic linkages when sanctions 
are lifted. Non-democratic states have more flexibility to nationalize industries 
and/or interfere in trade. This leads to quick increases in uncertainty and risk 
and thus of transaction costs which hurt trade (North, 1990; Eichengreen & 
Irwin, 2009). In contrast, democratic institutions reduce transaction costs and 
promote trust and stability between economic actors by legitimizing contracts, 
protecting private property, among others (Uzzi, 1997; Milner & Kubota, 2005; 
Aidt & Gassebner, 2010). Overall, better quality of political institutions helps 
trade to return to its pre-sanctions levels faster (Hardin, 1993; Uzzi, 1997).   
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4  Social and political effects 
On the political side, sanctions might or might not lead to regime change or 
achievement of other objectives. Empirical studies consistently show that 
effectiveness of sanctions is questionable as they fail to achieve their aims in 65 
– 95% of cases (Hufbauer et al., 2009; Pape, 1998). In order to assess 
sanctions’ effectiveness, one should measure it against the actual goal attached 
to the issue of sanctions. While doing this, it is important to recognise that 
sanctions impose costs on both the target and the sender, and both those sides 
should be considered. The costs suffered by the sender and imposed on her 
constituents are a strong statement of norms and resolve in achieving desired 
results – a powerful signal to the target (Bierksteker & van Bergeijk, 2015). 
Sanctions can destabilize regimes, even if other desired political outcomes do 
not materialize (Marinov, 2005), and increase political repression in targeted 
states (e.g., Perksen & Drury, 2009; Browne, 2011; Escribà-Folch, 2012; 
Lucena Carneiro & Apolinário Jr., 2016). Dizaji and Murshed (2020) find that 
arms embargoes specifically lead to a reduction in military expenditure, the size 
of military forces, and involvement of the military in politics. Although this 
demilitarisation improves the different aspects of democracy in developing 
countries, the drawback is that these improvements are accompanied by an 
exacerbation of ethnic tensions and internal conflict.  
4.1 Conditions for sanctions’ success 
The literature on whether economic sanctions succeed in inducing alterations 
in the target country’s behaviour is a matter lacking consensus in the academic 
literature (see, van Bergeijk, 2019). Schneider and Weber (2019) argue that 
sanctions or ‘economic coercion’ met with some success during the immediate 
post-Cold War period from 1989 to 2016, which they characterize as the 
‘liberal era’. With regard to credibility, van Marrewijk and van Bergeijk (1995) 
demonstrate that sanctions may work in the long-run if the target nation 
gradually learns about the credibility of sanctions, costs to its economy and the 
sender’s determination. Furthermore, there is also a debate about whether 
unilateral or multilateral sanctions work better in changing behaviour (Bapat & 
Clifton, 2009), as well as the greater efficacy of sanctions that target individual 
firms rather than the target’s entire economy (Ahn and Ludema, 2019). A 
remaining theoretical lacunae remains in terms of the credibility of compliance 
with the sanctions on the part of the target nation: it might very well be that a 
sanctioned nation feigns compliance with the sender’s wishes but secretly 
reneges on them. 
Lektzian and Patterson (2015) theoretically model the success of sanctions 
based on a factor-based model of political economy and draw conclusions 
about sanctions’ impact on the distribution of political power within the target 
country, depending on its openness to international markets. In their analysis, 
they treat sanctions as exogenous shocks which reduce target country’s 
exposure to international trade and finance, and assume that: (i) owners and 
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intensive users of the abundant factor of production hold economic and 
political power in a country with an open trade regime, whereas (ii) it is the 
owners and intensive users of scarce factors of production who hold economic 
and political power in a country which is closed to international trade. These 
structures matter for the impact of sanctions. If real rates of return to the 
abundant factors of production are diminished by sanctions, we should expect 
the owners of those factors to press the government for changes that would 
result in lifting of the sanctions. Conversely, in a close economy the sanctions 
should exert negative impact on the owners of the scarce factors of 
productions so that they use their economic and political power to push for 
policy changes that would bring an end to sanctions. Another lesson from the 
Lektzian and Patterson’s model is that by applying pressure in certain points, 
sanctions may cause shifts in the relative wealth and consequently political 
power distribution and dynamics in the target economy. In particular, 
government may be more willing to make concessions if sanctions threaten the 
strength and wealth of governing elites and empower their political challengers.  
In the context of the sanctions success, Bierksteker and van Bergeijk 
(2015) postulate seven conditions which enhance the probability of achieving 
policy goals attached to the sanctions. First, in order to exert real pressure and 
inflict economic pain on the target, trade volumes between the target and the 
sender should constitute a substantial share of the target’s economy prior to 
the imposition of sanctions. Second, the likelihood of sanctions success is the 
largest in the initial years after the imposition, thus sanctions (or their threat) 
should ‘bite’ immediately. Third, the sender should not neglect the importance 
of the psychological factors associated with expectations, credibility and 
strategic interaction. They argue that sanctions hurt most when they are not 
anticipated and that their threat may be more effective than the actual 
imposition. The risk tolerance of targets should also be considered: the more 
risk-tolerant the target the less likely sanctions are to be effective. Fourth, the 
target’s political regime matters. More democratic or less authoritarian regimes 
are more likely to cave in under the pressure of sanctions whereas ideology-
driven regimes are difficult to coerce. In some cases, sanctions may strengthen 
rather than weaken the target government by boosting its popular support 
through the rally around the flag effect. Fifth, sanctions are more effective 
when they are multilateral as inclusion of multiple senders reduces the target’s 
chances of sanctions evasion or trade diversification. Sixth, a single type of 
targeted sanctions should not be imposed in isolation. Simultaneous imposition 
of three or more different types of targeted sanctions (e.g. import restrictions, 
export limitations and financial sanctions) enhances the effectiveness of 
coercion, signalling and constraint. Seventh, comprehensive sanctions lead to 
substantial collateral damage while targeted sanctions cause less damage but 
can be as effective as comprehensive sanctions. 
4.2 Sanctions’ impact on regime and democracy 
The effect of sanctions on democracy and state repression is expected to 
depend on the degree of democracy already present in the targeted nation 
18 
 
(Blad, 2019) as well as the context surrounding the imposition of sanctions. 
For example, Peksen and Drury (2010) note that sanctions tend to worsen the 
democratic credentials of targeted countries, assigning this outcome to the rally 
around the flag effect induced by sanctions. However, Frye (2019) did not find 
any evidence of such effect in his survey of the Russian public about their 
attitudes towards the sanctions imposed on the country following the 
annexation of Crimea. In contrast, he observes that the support for the 
Russian government actually declined among some groups, suggesting at least 
partial effectiveness of sanctions, but at the same time the public voiced 
diminished support for the sender countries. Things appeared to work 
differently in Qatar following the 2017 blockade. Another survey-based study 
by Gengler and Al-Khelaifi (2019) shows mobilisation of Qatari citizens 
behind the country’s authorities in an attempt to stave off negative 
consequences of the blockade. Thus, the evidence here is mixed and the effect 
of sanctions on the attitudes of the target’s public opinion is likely to be non-
homogenous and differ from country to country and case to case.  
Bierksteker and van Bergeijk (2015) argue that authoritarian regimes are 
less likely to be coerced by an imposition of sanctions. However, Peksen 
(2019a) shows that this effect is not homogenous across various types of 
autocratic regimes. His results show that single-party and military regimes are 
capable of withstanding foreign coercion and pressure thanks to their 
enhanced capability for repressive tactics and positive inducements towards 
citizens, whereas sanctions targeted at “personalist” regimes are likely to be as 
effective as those imposed on democracies due to “personalist” regimes’ lack 
of strong institutional capacity.  
4.3 Humanitarian impact of sanctions 
A large part of the literature has only studied the effects of sanctions on major 
economic relationships, while neglecting the broader costs to society. Research 
suggests that during sanction episodes there are substantial non-economic 
impacts on health (Shahabi, 2015; Shahabi et al., 2015; Kheirandish et al., 
2015), gender (Drury & Peksen, 2014) and human rights (Browne, 2011). 
There can be an impact of sanctions on human rights, as regime close ranks 
and target public goods benefits to a narrower coterie of supporters (Peksen, 
2009). Economic sanctions and blockades often lead to substantial suffering by 
vulnerable groups, as happened in Iraq, former Yugoslavia, and Haiti (Weiss, 
1999). Sanctions impose suffering on societies through the limited availability 
of clean water, food, medicines and healthcare services (Cortright & Lopez, 
2000; Garfield, 2002), leading to a pernicious effect on life expectancy and 
infant mortality in the target country (Ali & Shah, 2000; Daponte & Garfield, 
2000). Moreover, they dampen the target’s government expenditures on 
education, health and culture by restricting the government revenues 
(Farzanegan 2011; Dizaji 2014). Most of the existing studies on such societal 
and living standard impacts of sanctions are qualitative and based on single-
country case studies of sanctions imposed by the US or the UN, thus their 
findings may not be readily generalized to other target countries or cases of  
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sanctions imposed by other senders. Maloney (2015) had also studied 
economic hardships and its relationship with policy change, which exists yet 
not immediately nor in a linear manner. She also addressed the way on how 
economic sanctions reshape decision making, by studying the case of Iran in 
light of the US sanctions. 
4.4 Impact on international alliances 
Economic sanctions may put strain and pressure on international alliances, 
affecting their reliability, strength and durability. The target country may expect 
support from its allies or seek it from other third countries (Naylor, 2001; 
Early, 2012; Shin et al., 2016). Conversely, the target may suffer from a loss of 
reputation which may it within the international community and deter other 
countries from tightening political or economic relations, including providing 
aid and investments (Neuenkirch & Neumeier, 2015). However, regimes 
respond in various ways to sanction. For instance, the Iranian regime’s 
responses to sanctions have ranged from enthusiasm, to ridicule, and threats of 
retaliation (Amuzegar, 2014). 
Finally, force is the ultimate option if economic sanctions fail to achieve 
their targeted goals. There are many reasons to resort to force in this case, such 
as preserving prestige, legitimise their initially imposed sanctions, justify its 
policy of demonisation towards the target (Gartner and Shahmoradi, 2019). 
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5  Methodological challenges 
Studies of economic sanctions and blockades encounter numerous 
methodological challenges which appear to be driven by two main issues: the 
availability and reliability of data, and econometric modelling difficulties caused 
by the endogenous relationship among social and economic factors (variables).  
Van Bergeijk and Siddiquee (2017) demonstrate the importance and 
implications of the first aforementioned challenge. They scrutinise how 
changes appearing in the often used and widely cited sanctions database from 
the Peterson Institute between its second (Hufbauer et al., 1990) and third 
editions (Hufbauer et al., 2007) influence the empirical results based on those 
data.  They identify considerable differences in case selection and (re)coding 
between the two versions which are not transparently explained or justified by 
the datasets’ authors but may lead to significant differences in result and policy 
prescriptions in studies based on the data. For example, the 205 cases that 
appear in the third edition do not include all 108 cases that were reported in 
the second edition. Changes were made in the way the dataset measures the 
success of economic sanctions and the sanction attributes. By conducting 
multivariate probit regressions, van Bergeijk and Siddiquee (2017) show that 
these changes on their own make it more likely to find the same episodes of 
sanctions successful. Overall, the authors show that the changes in the dataset 
methodology lead to upward bias in assessing the sanctions’ contribution to 
modest policy change, duration, and cost to target country. Downward bias are 
identified in evaluation of the sanctions’ contribution to regime change, 
military impairment, companion policies, and cost to the sender country. These 
biases lead to real policy implications. For example, the evidence that sanctions 
appear less likely to impair target’s military capacity and, therefore disrupt its 
military endeavours, combined with the evidence on the importance of good 
prior relations for sanctions’ success (Hufbauer et al., 2007) provide an 
argument that success of sanctions could be helped if they are introduced as a  
“shock therapy” rather than implemented gradually (see also Bierksteker & van 
Bergeijk, 2015). 
Van Bergeijk and Siddiquee (2017) also identify a major shortcoming of 
currently available data (not only Hufbauer et al.’s) which may cause significant 
biases in empirical results: the tendency to under-report sanction episodes 
between countries of no major power status, sanctions imposed in relative 
secrecy and those without documentation in English. Unfortunately, such 
skewed samples risk in empirical analysis are likely to lead to unreliable results 
from which not much can be learned. Another methodological challenge is 
that sanctions are typically accompanied by other foreign and security policy 
tools, e.g. incentives and diplomatic pressure, which may further confound 
their effects (Bierksteker & van Bergeijk, 2015). It is notoriously difficult to 
reliably measure and consider all those tools, some of which may remain 
secretive, in applied empirical analysis but their exclusion is likely to result in 
the omitted variable bias and only a partial understanding of the role sanctions 
play in shaping foreign policy (Peksen, 2019b). 
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Nonetheless, even the aspects that can be fairly easily observed and 
measured are not always correctly captured by researchers. Van Bergeijk and 
Siddiquee (2017) point out that trade linkages between the target and the 
sender should be expressed as a share of target’s GDP rather than the share of 
total trade, which is the common practice in the literature, as the former 
captures better the overall economic pain of sanctions to the target.  
The vector autoregressive (VAR) models have been applied in several 
previous studies to capture the dynamic economic and political impacts of 
sanctions (e.g., Farzanegan, 2011; Dizaji & Bergeijk, 2013; Dizaji, 2014; Dizaji, 
2019a). VAR models are based on the historical responses of macroeconomic 
and political variables to exogenous shocks, i.e. sanctions in our context. 
However, there are two weaknesses associated with applying traditional VAR 
models. Firstly, conventional VAR models are unable to capture nonlinear 
dynamics of regime-switching and asymmetric responses to shocks. Economic 
theory suggests that the effects of sanctions are influenced by conditions in the 
target country. Secondly, models of the international transmission of sanction 
shocks have only studied the major economic relationships, while neglecting 
the broader costs to society. This provides a strong argument for broadening 
the set of variables while the traditional VAR models cannot be used for a 
large group of variables. To overcome this problem some studies have applied 
Panel VAR (PVAR) models (Dizaji, 2019b; Dizaji & Murshed 2020). The lack 
of data is one of the main causes of scarcity of studies addressing 
macroeconomic fluctuations in sanctioned countries and a major threat to their 
validity. PVAR enables the observations from several countries to be pooled 
together, producing more accurate results.  
In order to examine the impact of sanctions and blockades on the 
structure of international trade some studies have extended the standard 
formulation of gravity model to include sanctions dummy variables (Hufbauer 
et al.,1997; Hufbauer & Oegg, 2003; Caruso, 2003). The gravity model of 
international trade is inspired by the principles of Newtonian physics and its 
basic intuition is that the larger economies of two countries are and the closer 
is the distance between them, the larger the trade flows between them 
(Anderson, 1979). According to Kaempfer and Ross (2004) the gravity 
approach performs better in prolonged sanction episodes because it can 
dynamically account for other exogenous shocks and changes to countries’ 
economies that may considerably alter their trade profiles, something that time 
series methods may struggle with. 
A way to escape the challenges of data analysis for a wide sample of 
countries might be offered by the case study methods which are frequently 
employed within international political economy and international relations, 
including economic sanctions (e.g., Levy, 1999; Ghodoosi, 2013; Kasprzak & 
Sterninski, 2017; Han, 2018; Taheri & Guven-Lisaniler, 2018) and blockades 
(e.g., Lektzian & Ragauskas, 2016). Their appeal lies in the ability to 
comprehensively document studied processes, preserve and report more case-
relevant information than a large-N statistical study and, consequently, lead to 




6  Summary 
The current state of researchers’ knowledge of the effects of sanctions contains 
several gaps. Studies utilizing rigorous methodological approaches are fairly 
new and few, and most work to date is based on anecdotal and/or 
circumstantial evidence. Most of the existing studies consider sanctions from 
the perspective of a sender country (e.g., Baldwin, 2000; Drenzer, 2000; Early, 
2012), thus largely ignoring their impact on many aspects of the target 
countries’ policymaking. Such aspects as target countries’ internal economic 
policies, impact on value chains, economic diversification, including the 
informal economy, political stability, internal security and existing international 
alliances are too often ignored. Going further, the literature offers little in 
terms of the evidence on the impact of blockades imposed on a country by its 
neighbours, which is a particularly important and interesting avenue of 
research 
Sanctions and blockades disrupt the flow of international trade in goods 
and services as well as the flow of capital. These will have consequences for the 
composition of output, employment levels, as well as consumption and 
investment. There will be impacts on households and firms in targeted nations. 
Additionally, they will affect also government expenditures. Apart from the 
long-run growth consequences of sanctions and blockades, many of the 
macroeconomic effects of sanctions are likely to be short-lived, decaying over 
time as the economy adjusts to sanctions. It is important to study the 
adjustment processes of the economy, which this project will address.  
Another issue which has so far been neglected in the literature is the effect 
the lifting of sanctions has on trade flows and economic relations between 
target and sender countries. The question that remains unanswered is whether 
the two sides reconstruct their trade relationship immediately following the 
removal of sanctions, or with a time lag or perhaps not at all. The modified 
simulation (econometric) techniques based on Vector Autoregressive (VAR) 
models are suggested to address these asymmetric impacts and differences 
between the shocks of imposing and lifting the sanctions. 
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